Abstract Whether the law should reserve the power to impose a whole life sentence on an individual found guilty of murder in the most serious cases raises issues surrounding just punishment, public protection and a humane criminal justice system. The prospect of a prisoner being incarcerated for their whole life -as opposed to receiving a life sentence where they will be considered for release on license for life after a determined, or flexible term, begs the question whether such sentences are inconsistent with the liberty and dignity of the prisoner. In addition, there are two related questions: whether each individual state (within the Council of Europe)
3 on strong punitive grounds. In that case the Court accepted that a sentence of this nature necessarily entailed anxiety and uncertainty relating to prison life and life after release, but on the facts it found that there were no aggravating circumstances to conclude that the applicant had undergone an exceptional ordeal capable of constituting treatment contrary to article 3. 4 The specific issue of the review of such sentences was addressed by the European Court in Panayi (aka Kafkaris) v Cyprus, 5 where it was held that the imposition of an indeterminate life sentence did not necessarily violate Article 3 (or Article 5 -guaranteeing protection against arbitrary deprivation of liberty). The Court stated that although the imposition of an irreducible life sentence could be inconsistent with Article 3, this would only be the case where there was no hope, prospect or possibility of release. 6 In that case, it found that although a whole life sentence was possible, there were provisions in domestic law for suspension and remission of the sentence. Thus, although such a sentence entailed a level of anxiety, given the possibilities of release it was not one which gave rise to a violation of Article 3. 7 European Court jurisprudence thus appeared to outlaw the imposition of whole life sentences where there was no clear possibility of release, even where the initial whole life term was justified as proportionate 4 For a discussion on very long and disproportionate sentences and their compatibility with article 3, see 4 to the crime. However, the UK domestic courts were of the view that even an irreducible term could comply with the Convention and the Human Rights Act 1998. Thus, in R (Wellington) that the threat of an imposition (by an American court) of a whole life sentence in lieu of the death penalty did not automatically violate Article 3, because although the prisoner was to be subjected to a blanket rule, in this case the punishment was by no means out of proportion to the gravity of the offence. In any case, their Lordships insisted that a life sentence under domestic law was not irreducible, following the decision in R v Bieber, 9 where it was held that a whole life term should not be construed as irreducible, and that
any claim that such a sentence violated Article 3 should be made not at the time of the sentence's imposition, but at a time when it is claimed that any further detention would be in breach of that article. Indeed the domestic courts had gone so far as to suggest that irreducible whole life sentences were not in violation of the Convention. Although the available to the defendant. In such a case, in the court's view whole life orders imposed as a matter of judicial discretion as to the appropriate level of punishments and deterrence for a crime of utmost seriousness would not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment.
Such an order was not prescriptive and was one of last resort, reserved for the few exceptionally serious offences for which after reflecting on all aggravation and mitigation, the judge was satisfied that just punishment required the imposition of a whole life sentence. Rights and the effect of that appeal is considered in the conclusion, below.
7 proportionality when making provision for such sentences and their review. However, the article will also note that the most recent decision of the European Court has misinterpreted the wording and spirit of Vinter, and will contribute to create uncertainty for the prisoner and the domestic judiciary with respect to the rules on review and release of life sentence prisoners.
THE DECISION OF THE GRAND CHAMBER IN VINTER MOORE AND BAMBER V UNITED KINGDOM
This decision is at the centre of the compatibility of whole life sentences with Article 3 of the European Convention -which provides that no one shall be subject to torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Thus, all domestic law must comply with the basic principles laid down in this judgment, although, as we shall see the Grand
Chamber allow some level of discretion with respect to the domestic law and how it regulates such sentences and their review.
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In The Grand Chamber's decision in Vinter, whilst not prescribing particular forms of review necessary to comply with Article 3, clearly states that the imposition of a whole life sentence without the safeguard of sufficiently clear rules on future review and release will constitute inhuman punishment and thus be in breach of Article 3:
'…a whole life prisoner should not be obliged to wait and serve an indeterminate number of years of his sentence before he can raise the complaint that the legal conditions attaching to his sentence fail to comply with the requirements of Article 3 in this regard. This would be contrary to both legal certainty and to the general principles on victim status within Article 34…Furthermore, in cases where the sentence on imposition, is irreducible under domestic law, it would be capricious to expect the prisoner wo work towards his own rehabilitation without knowing whether, at an unspecified, future date, a mechanism might be introduced which would allow him, on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be Thus, it is no longer necessary to for a court to wait until the time that the prisoner can realistically show that they are no longer a risk to the public and show sufficient atonement for their actions; hope should be given at the outset of the sentence and the current judgment takes into account the human dignity of the prisoner and not just possibility of the arbitrary nature of their continued detention. 15
In the first of conjoined appeals the Attorney-General referred to the court as unduly lenient a minimum term of 40 years which had been passed on M following a plea of guilty for murder; the judge being reluctant to impose a whole life sentence because of the ruling in Vinter, above. In the second case, N appealed against his whole life sentence on the grounds that such sentences were now incompatible with Article 3 and the ruling The Court of Appeal held firstly that there were some crimes that were so heinous that Parliament was entitled to feel that a whole life order should be imposed; such a sentence was not incompatible with Article 3 and the Grand Chamber's judgment in
Vinter did not dispute that. According to the Court of Appeal, although there may be a dispute about which crimes warranted such an order, the state would be allowed a certain margin of appreciation in making that decision. 37 Thus, Vinter did not question the validity of whole life orders in appropriate cases; rather it insisted that such a sentence without the prospect of review and release would be contrary to Article 3 as it would 16 involve the prisoner in being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. Further, it is essential that a system of review exists at the time that the sentence is passed. Chamber stressed that such a finding did not give any of the applicants the prospect of immediate release, and that whether they should be released would depend on whether there were still sound penological reasons for their continued detention and whether they should continue to be detained be detained on grounds of dangerousness. In that respect, therefore, the Court of Appeal's decision appears to be in line with the Grand Chamber's judgment, despite there being a lack of formal process to check on the imposition of potentially arbitrary whole life sentences. 41 Ibid, at para 36 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the judge in M had clearly erred in not making a whole life order because he felt such an order was not consistent with article 3 or Vinter. In that case, and taking into account that it was M's second murder and committed on conditional release from prison; see also 'Killer who struck again on day release avoids life sentence,' The Times, 22 October 2013), the case was so serious that the punishment required a whole life sentence. The Court of Appeal also held that the trial judge had been entitled to impose a whole life sentence in N's case -his second murder, committed whilst he was in prison serving a life sentence, and there being no mitigation.
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As noted above, the Grand Chamber rejected the government's pleas that with a human rights-friendly interpretation the provision allowing release on medical grounds McLoughlin brought welcome clarification of the legal position concerning "whole life orders", it believed that, in view of the legal uncertainty that remains about the availability of a review mechanism for such orders, more specific details need to be provided about this mechanism, including the timetable on which such a review can be sought, the grounds on which it can be sought, who should conduct such a review, and the periodic availability of further such reviews after the first review. The Committee then added that the current Bill provided an opportunity for Parliament to remove any legal uncertainty by specifying the details of the review mechanism, and that an amendment be added to the Bill to give Parliament the opportunity to debate the desirability of amending the statutory framework to put beyond legal doubt the availability of this mechanism, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. The more recent decision in Trabelsi v Belgium 56 further re-iterates the requirement that the prospect of release must be a realistic one, so that the sentence is reducible both de jure and de facto. In this case, a Tunisian national who had been sentenced by a Belgian court to ten year's imprisonment for attempting to blow up a military base was the subject of an extradition request by the United States government to face charges with respect to offences relating to Al-Qaeda inspired acts of terrorism. The Belgian authorities sought assurances form the US authorities that that the death penalty would not be imposed on him, or that any life sentence should be accompanied by the possibility of commutation of that sentence. Such assurances were given and the extradition request was granted. 55 Rejecting the government's argument that the applicant had been imprisoned for life because he was the author of particularly serious terrorist crimes, the Court recalled that the Convention did not permit derogation from art.3 in any circumstances. The Court emphasised that its finding should not be interpreted as providing the applicant with a prospect of imminent release. Rather, it obliged the Turkish government to amend the law to set in place a procedure which provided after a certain minimum period of time for a compulsory assessment of whether the applicant's detention could still be justified. 28 power of release in domestic legislation to a sufficient extent so as to comply with the Grand Chamber's judgment in Vinter. 
In this case
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could not be interpreted to cover release on grounds of rehabilitation, and that the Lifer
Manual that gave guidance on review had not been amended since Vinter, the European Court nevertheless noted that subsequently the UK Court of Appeal had established that the secretary was bound to use the power in a manner that was compatible with Article 3. 61 Thus, in the Court's view if an offender subject to a whole life order could establish that 'exceptional circumstances' had arisen subsequent to the sentence, the secretary of state had to consider whether such circumstances justified release on compassionate grounds. Regardless of the policy set out in the Lifer Manual, the secretary had to consider all the relevant circumstances, in a manner compatible with Article 3. 62 Further, any decision by the Secretary would have to be reasoned by reference to the circumstances of each case and would be subject to judicial review, which would serve to elucidate the meaning of the terms 'exceptional circumstances' and compassionate grounds, as was the usual practice under the common law.
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The European Court then recalled that it was primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation, 64 before deciding that where in the circumstances of the case, the national court had, following the Grand Chamber's judgment in Vinter addressed the doubts of the Grand Chamber and set out an unequivocal statement of the legal position, the European Court must accept the found that the failure to amend the statutory provision, or even the Lifer Manual, was fatal to the government's claim that it had complied with the judgment in Vinter. Finally, although the Grand Chamber did not regard a review after twenty five years as mandatory, leaving the state to decide that issue within its margin of appreciation, surely a the prisoner is entitled to know the earliest time that his release can be reviewed. That aspect of the statutory scheme, as with most of the process, remains a mystery.
WHOLE LIFE SENTENCES AND THE PROPER ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Grand Chamber's decision in Vinter is to be welcomed for its clarification on the issue of when a human rights challenge to the effects of a life sentence can be mounted.
Thus, after Vinter it is quite clear that a prisoner is entitled to ask the courts -domestic or European -to make a decision on the compatibility of the review mechanisms of such sentences at any stage, including at the outset, and do not have to wait for the sentence to reach the point where it would be inhuman to continue with detention at that stage. The
Grand Chamber and the European Court has stressed that the rule of law and the requirement of certainty should allow the prisoner to predict the circumstances under which he may be released in the future, and that such circumstances should be promulgated with sufficient certainty in domestic legislation. The Court must, therefore, tread a fine line between upholding the rights in the Convention when finding a violation during its judicial decision-making role, and dictating to the member state on the content and scope of its domestic law in that area.
Taking the example of whole life sentences, the Court has the power, and duty, to rule on the question of whether such sentences are compatible with Article 3 -in other words whether they are inhuman and degrading, either by their very nature or because of the manner in which they are passed or reviewed. Such a question is one of law and requires the interpretation of the relevant article by the European Court, who must use accepted principles of international human rights law in reaching its conclusions. Using that power, the Court and the Grand Chamber has ruled that such sentences are capable of being unjust and of causing the prisoner unacceptable distress and anxiety, and that this will constitute a violation of Article 3 unless domestic law contains a procedure whereby these sentences are capable of review, and, in appropriate cases, the prisoner released at a where the receiving state had agreed that the individual would not be executed in accordance with the law, and would be pardoned by the President, but where there was no legal framework for such pardon; it being simply common ground that the President would pardon such an individual. Thus the court found that there was no legal basis for allowing the prisoner to serve a sentence other than the one that was imposed for murder -a death sentence -and thus no material to suggest that the President would consider his release on the basis of the facts of the case or his personal circumstances. 
CONCLUSIONS
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights with respect to whole life sentences raises a number of important issues with respect to the protection of prisoners' rights, the principles of legality and proportionality, and the desirability of the European Court's power to impose Convention standards on individual member states.
Clear rules on review and release of whole life prisoners would raise legitimate expectations on behalf of the prisoner as to the period of incarceration and provide the domestic authorities with clear and reviewable powers of any review process. Thus, although the European Court is not willing to dictate the precise rules relating to review and release, it has stressed that Article 3 requires national authorities to be allowed to review whole life sentences in order to assess whether their continued detention is no longer be justified. Further, the prisoner is entitled to know, from the beginning of their sentence, what they have to do to be considered for release and under what conditions.
The alternative is to have open ended and unclear powers of review, leaving the authorities with an unfettered power to consider release and leaving the prisoner in a state of uncertainty as to whether and on what grounds they will ever be considered for review and release. Unfortunately, the decision of the Court of Appeal, as affirmed by
